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Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability
Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique
Alan 0. Sykes*
"Bad faith" litigation between insurers and insureds encompasses a
range of issues: the insured may challenge the denial of benefits under a
first-party policy,' the insured may challenge the quality of the insurer's
defense effort under a third-party liability policy,2 or the insured may
challenge a decision by an insurer to settle a case in which the insured
would bear much of the cost due to a sizeable deductible.' Another com-
mon type of dispute arises when insurers expose their insureds to substan-
tial uncovered liability through the rejection of settlement offers, followed
by litigation that results in a judgment in excess of both the settlement offer
and the policy limits.4 These cases are the subject of this Paper.5
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B.A. 1973, College of William and
Mary; M.A. 1977, M. Phil. 1978, i.D. 1982, Ph.D. 1987, Yale University. I havereceived thoughtful
comments from Thomas Baker and from participants at a Cornell Law School faculty workshop. I wish
to thank the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the Scaife Foundation for financial support.
1. See STEPHENS. ASHLEY, BAD FAiTH AcTnONS: LWarrY AND DAMAGES § 2:14 (1992) (detail-
ing and criticizing the rationales used to extend the bad faith cause of action to first-party insurance
claims); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw § 7.9(a), at 907-08 (student's ed.
1988) (explaining that numerous jurisdictions have recognized a tort of insurer bad faith in first-party
insurance claims).
2. See ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 4:10 (recognizingthat some courts have allowed a cause of action
for bad faith failure to defend); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 7.9(c) (remarking that several
courts have held that the insurer's duty to defend is subject to a good faith standard).
3. See NationwideMut. Ins. Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 435 S.E.2d 561 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (sug-
gesting that an insured can maintain a bad faith cause of action against an insurer for settling for the
amount of the deductible); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1185-93 (1990)
(identifying the conflicting interests of insureds and insurers in the settlement of a third-party claim
when the policy contains a large deductible).
4. See ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 2:05 (noting that a bad faith cause of action can arise when an
insurer, defending a claim that exceeds the policy limits, risks a judgment exceeding the policy limits
rather than settling for the full amount of coverage); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 7.8(a), at 877
(observing that courts in many states have concluded that insurers are required to act in good faith to
pursue a settlement within the applicable policy limits).
5. Such cases are also the focus of a thorough survey by Kent Syverud in which he touches on
many of the issues that I address here. See generally Syverud, supra note 3 (examining the way in
which insurers and their insureds contract for the contingency of settlement and its effect on litigation);
Charles M. Silver, A Missed Misalignment of Interests: A Comment on Syverud, The Duty to Settle,
77 V.A. L. REV. 1585 (1991) (critiquing Syverud's views regarding insurers' incentives to reject
settlement offers).
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Disputes over the rejection of settlement offers by insurers would not
arise absent provisions in insurance contracts setting policy limits because
an insured with unlimited coverage would face no exposure in the event of
a large judgment. Likewise, these settlement disputes would not arise ab-
sent provisions giving insurers control over the decision whether to settle
or litigate. However, many, and perhaps most, liability insurance policies
contain both types of provisions.' Consequently, a conflict of interest be-
tween the insurer and the insured can arise whenever the outcome of liti-
gation is uncertain.
Suppose, for example, that an insured has been involved in an accident
in which an injured party has suffered damages of $100,000. The in-
sured's policy affords coverage up to $50,000. Assume further that the
plaintiff cannot recover without proof of negligence and that an honest
assessment of the case suggests a fifty-percent probability that the insured
will be found negligent. The expected judgment against the insured is thus
$50,000, an amount exactly equal to the policy limit. Suppose finally that
the plaintiff offers to settle for that amount before trial. Putting aside any
reputational damage that might accompany a decision to settle, the insured
will prefer to accept the settlement offer because, ignoring any deductible,
the insurer is contractually obligated to pay the entire amount. The in-
surer, however, will wish to accept the settlement offer only if the total
expected cost of going to trial would be greater than $50,000, again putting
aside any reputational concerns. Therefore, the insurer will prefer to reject
the offer unless defense costs exceed $25,000 because the insurer's ex-
pected liability at the conclusion of trial, not including defense costs, is
$25,000. 7 Such a refusal to settle exposes the insured to the possibility of
$50,000 in uncovered liability should negligence be found.
This potential conflict of interest has been well understood for de-
cades, and courts have long considered the question of what, if anything,
to do about it.8 Early courts often held the insured to the bargain that
As suggested in the text, an insured may at times prefer to litigate when the insurer wishes to
settle. This divergence of interests may occur for several reasons: the insured may bear a large deduct-
ible in the event of settlement, Syverud, supra note 3, at 1188-89, or the insurer may fail to consider
the reputstional damage a settlement would cause the insured to suffer, id. at 1158. 1 do not address
these problems here.
6. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing the terms giving settlement discretion
to insurers). Policy limits are, of course, ubiquitous.
7. The insurer has a 50% chance of owing nothing and a 50% chance of owing $50,000 if the case
goes to trial. The expected cost of trying the case is therefore $25,000, absent defense costs. The cost
of settling, on the other hand, is a certain payment of $50,000. Thus, if litigation costs are less than
$25,000, a risk-neutral insurer will prefer to reject a $50,000 settlement offer, assuming its only
concern is its own financial exposure.
8. See, e.g., Syverud, supra note 3, at 1116 ("For seventy-fiveyears, courts have invoked a doc-
trine known as 'the duty to settle' to impose liability on insurance companies who fail to settle lawsuits
against the people they insure.").
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appeared on the face of the policy and allowed the insurer essentially
unfettered discretion to litigate even when the insured would much prefer
a settlement.' In contrast, other early courts imposed on the insurer an
obligation to take into account the insured's interests during settlement
negotiations.10 Today, the view that courts must restrict the ability of
insurers to reject settlement offers is virtually universal,11 although the
precise statement of the insurer's obligations varies. For example, courts
may say that the insurer must exercise "due care" to protect the interests
of the insured, that it must act in "good faith" with regard to the interests
of the insured, or that it must avoid rejecting settlement offers in "bad
faith."" Courts also differ in the implementation of these concepts' 3 and
in the remedies available when an insurer breaches its obligations. 4
The most widespread approach is the "disregard-the-limits" rule, ad-
vocated years ago by Robert Keeton." This principle requires the insurer
to behave in settlement negotiations as if the policy contained no limits
upon the insurer's obligations to pay.16 The usual remedy against an
9. See, e.g., Georgia Casualty Co. v. Cotton Mills Prods. Co., 132 So. 73, 76-77 (Miss. 1931)
(holding that the insurer had no obligation to settle a third-party claim within the policy limits); St.
Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employers' Indem. Corp., 23 S.W.2d 215, 221 (Mo. Ct. App.
1930) (refusing to find a duty to settle because "[wie could nothold... that refusal to settle was negli-
gent, unless we assumed... that it is the duty of the insurance company to shut its eyes to its own
interests and seek only the protection of the assured when an offer of settlement is made').
10. Among the earliest cases imposing limitations upon the insurer's discretion in the settlement
context is Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914) (holding that the insurer,
by refusing to settle, violated the obligations of good faith underlying all contracts).
11. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 7.8(a), at 877 (stating that, in general, courts hold that
an insurer cannot exercise unrestricted discretion in accepting or rejecting settlements).
12. For citations to cases stating each expression of the doctrine, see id. § 7.8(b)(1). Actions
against an insurer for failure to consider properly the interests of the insured may sound in contract for
breach of an implied term or in tort for breach of a duty of care, id. § 7.8(a), at 877-78, a distinction
that is of little practical importance in most cases. But see id. (acknowledging that the contract-tort
distinction may sometimes prove significant if, for example, a contract suit has a longer statute of limi-
tations or if a tort claim permits a broader measure of damages). In some states, the insured has a
choice between the two theories. Id. § 7.8(a), at 878-79.
13. See id. § 7.8(b)(2) (observing that appellate courts differ as to the relative degree of con-
sideration that they require an insurer to give to the insured's interests in comparison with its own).
14. See id. § 8.7(h)-(i) (indicating that some courts limit consequential damages to the amount by
which the tort judgment exceeds the liability coverage whereas others allow emotional distress and puni-
tive damages).
15. Robert E. Keeton, Liabi/ity Insurance and Responsibiily for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1136, 1183-84 (1954).
16. Id. A leading case embracing this test is Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal.
1967). According to Crisci, "[in determining whether an insurer has given [proper] consideration to
the interests of the insured, the test is whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have ac-
cepted the settlement offer." Id. at 176. The popularity of this approach has been documented by
Kenneth Abraham: "The Crisci rule is standard law now in most jurisdictions.' KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 586 (1990) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW].
For further discussion of this approach, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTIBUTINa RISK: INSURANCE,
LEGALTHEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 192, 191-93 (1986) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, DisTRIBtrrINo RISK
HeinOnline  -- 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1347 1993-1994
Texas Law Review
insurer who fails to observe this rule is to allow the insured to recover the
amount by which the judgment at trial exceeds the policy limits.17 It is
misleading to label this a "bad faith" standard because the insured does not
need to show any malice or recklessness on the part of the insurer.18
Rather, it is enough that a reasonable insurer without a policy limit would
have accepted the settlement offer.19
This Paper employs economic analysis to explore the wisdom of such
judicial constraints on insurers' discretion to reject settlements. The issues
are complex, and the discussion accordingly tentative, but on the whole I
conclude that the economic case for a bad faith cause of action against the
insurer is, at best, uneasy when the insurance contract clearly provides the
insurer with discretion to settle or litigate. I base this claim on inferences
to be drawn from actual insurance contracts, on the potential that pretrial
bargaining between the insurer and the insured has to ameliorate conflicts
of interest, on the difficulty of fashioning and administering an acceptable
remedy for conflicts of interest in the settlement context, and on the un-
certainties surrounding the ex ante consequences of bad faith doctrine.
I. The Economic Argument for Constraints on Insurers' Discretion to
Reject Settlement Offers
Insurance contracts vary in their language, but typical liability policies
obligate the insurer to defend lawsuits alleging claims within the scope of
the policy and vest settlement discretion in the insurer. For example, the
Commercial General Liability Coverage Form drafted by the Insurance Ser-
vices Office provides: "We will have the right and duty to defend any
'suit' seeking [covered] damages. But ... [w]e may investigate and settle
any claim or 'suit' at our discretion."' Similarly, a standard auto policy
drafted by the Insurance Services Office provides: "We will settle or de-
fend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these
[covered] damages."21 Older contracts often put the matter slightly less
(explaining that the disregard-the-limits rule "gives insurers the incentive to act in an economically effi-
cient manner" because the insurer must internalize the risks of rejecting a reasonable settlement offer).
17. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 16, at 192.
18. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 7.8(b)(1)., at 883 ("[C]ourts have concluded that 'bad
faith' may exist even though the representatives of the company have been scrupulously honest in their
handling of the claim.").
19. See id. § 7.8(b)(2), at 884 (noting that several cases have required the insurer to "view the
opportunity for a settlement as it would if there were no limit of liability applicable to the insured's
coverage").
20. Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability CoverageForm (1984), in ABRAHAM,
INSuRANC E LAW, supra note 16, at 440, 442 [hereinafter Commercial Form].
21. InsuranceServices Office, Personal Auto Policy (1985), in ABRAHAM, INSURANCELAw, supra
note 16, at 602, 604 [hereinafter Auto Policy].
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precisely-the insurer "may make such investigation, negotiation, and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. "I
Provisions giving the insurer settlement discretion are often buried
somewhere in the middle of the policy, and many insureds may neglect to
read and reflect upon them. Judicial decisions restricting insurer discretion
in settlement typically do not proceed on a contract-of-adhesion or lack-of-
conspicuousness theory, however, perhaps because such decisions would
be hard to confine to settlement clauses and could then make it difficult for
insurers to enforce a vast range of other contractual terms designed to
control the risks that insurers undertake. Instead, courts sometimes suggest
that the policy language is ambiguous about the existence of any constraints
on the insurer's settlement discretion. Consequently, the parties should be
presumed to have intended that the insurer would act in good faith or with
due care toward the insured when exercising its discretion.' In the alter-
native, it is sometimes suggested that the insurer's obligation to provide the
insured with a legal defense creates "a reasonable expectation" that the
insurer will not disregard the insured's interests in settlement decisions, an
expectation that the law should protect.' "The insured has paid for at
least some consideration of his interests when settlement is contemplated.
Settlement decisions that completely ignore the insured's interest attempt
to reallocate this already allocated contractual advantage. They are abuses
of contractual discretion."25
These legal arguments in favor of constraints on insurers' discretion
in settlement can be bolstered with economic arguments. In the remainder
of Part I, I develop the economic arguments as forcefully as I can, with the
rejoinder to follow in Part II.
A. The Simple (Simplistic?) Economics of the Conflict-of-Interest Problem
The simplest economic argument for constraints on insurers' discretion
in settlement negotiations runs as follows:' Assume that the plaintiff's
22. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1, § 7.8(a). Virtually the same language is quoted in
ABRAHAM, DISTRBUTINGRISK, supra note 16, at 188.
23. See, e.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257, 258-59 (Wis. 1930) (suggesting
that any ambiguity in the language of the contract should be construed to impose a duty to make dis-
cretionary decisions in good faith), aff'd on reb'g, 235 N.W. 413 (Wis. 1931).
24. One court expressed this theory in the following way:
The insured surrenders to the insurer the right to investigate and compromise or contest
claims knowing that, in the event of a claim, the insurer will have its own interests to
consider. But an insured also has a right to assume that his interests will not be aban-
doned merely because the insurer faces the prospect of a full loss under the policy.
Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 250 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952); see aLso
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTiNoRISK, supra note 16, at 189 (discussing the insured's reasonable expectation
that the insurer will consider the insured's interests in settling a claim).
25. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 16, at 190.
26. The discussion that follows is an elaboration of the analysis first put forward in ABRAHAM,
1994] 1349
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settlement offer is "exogenous"-that is, it is fixed and unaffected by the
rule governing the insurer's discretion. Let the insurer bear all litigation
costs at trial, as many liability policies provide. Assume further that the
insured has the assets to pay any judgment in excess of the policy limits.
Finally, suppose the plaintiff makes an offer that is less than the sum of the
expected judgment at trial and the litigation costs that the insurer would
expend on the insured's behalf. Under these conditions, the joint expected
wealth' of the parties to the insurance contract would be greater if the
settlement offer were accepted than if it were rejected and the case liti-
gated. Nevertheless, the insurer may be tempted to reject the offer when
the insured bears part of the expected judgment because of a policy limit.
In other words, the policy limit allows the insurer to "externalize" some
of the risk of going to trial .'
To complete the argument, it is necessary to understand why parties
to an insurance contract would ordinarily desire ex ante that each behave
in a manner that increases joint expected wealth. To this end, it is useful
to recall and extend the numerical example found in the introduction.?
Again, the plaintiff's damages are $100,000, payable only if the insured is
found negligent. The probability of a negligence finding is 50%, the
policy limit is $50,000, and the settlement offer is $50,000. In addition,
assume the insurer's defense costs at trial are $20,000. In this example,
the parties' expected joint payment to the plaintiff at the conclusion of the
trial is $50,000, and the trial will generate $20,000 in defense costs. Thus,
the total, joint expected cost of a trial is $70,000, which plainly exceeds
the $50,000 settlement offer, and the settlement is joint-wealth-increasing.
The insurer, however, expects to pay only $25,000 at the conclusion of the
trial-the other $25,000 of expected liability being borne by the insured.'
When added to the costs of litigation, this amounts to only $45,000, a fig-
ure that is less than the $50,000 settlement offer. Suppose then that the
insurer, acting selfishly, rejects the settlement offer despite the negative
impact on the parties' joint wealth.
The parties in this illustration could make themselves jointly better off
if they could write a contract that would induce the insurer to accept the
settlement offer under these circumstances. This could be accomplished in
one of two ways. First, the insured could compensate the insurer for ac-
cepting the offer by paying the insurer $5000 at the time of settlement.
DISTRIBUTINGRISK, supra note 16, at 190-91, and in Syverud, supra note 3, at 1126-32, but it articu-
lates more clearly the assumptions that are required to develop the argument.
27. Joint expected wealth is simply the sum of the insurer's and the insured's expected wealth.
28. For an illustration of this problem, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
30. Like the insurer, the insured has a 50% probability of paying $50,000 (the difference between
the plaintiff's damages-$100,00-andthe portion that the insurer would pay-$50,000).
1350 [Vol. 72:1345
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The insurer would then be indifferent between going to trial, in which case
it would expect to pay $45,000, and settling for $50,000, in which case it
would still only pay $45,000 after receiving the $5000 payment from the
insured. The insured, on the other hand, would surely be better off with
this arrangement, because by paying $5000 to the insurer, the insured
would avoid a 50% chance of sustaining $50,000 in uncovered liability-an
expected cost of $25,000. Indeed, because the insured is risk averse-
otherwise insurance is not valuable-he would in fact be willing to pay
more than $25,000 to avoid an expected liability equal to that amount.31
This example illustrates a general principle: Whenever the insured's ex-
pected cost from the rejection of a settlement offer exceeds the insurer's
expected gain, a mutually advantageous arrangement can be devised where-
by the insured compensates the insurer for settling.
Of course, it is not necessary that the insured pay the insurer to settle
after a lawsuit has been filed. Instead, the parties could agree at the outset
of their contractual relationship that the insurer would settle under the
hypothesized circumstances. The insurance premium could then be in-
creased to compensate the insurer ex ante. To make this claim concrete,
suppose there is a 1 % chance of an accident that will lead to the above-
described circumstances. If the insurer anticipates that it will be able to act
selfishly in settlement by rejecting the offer, its expected cost from the
accident em ante is $450 (1 % of $45,000).32 The insured's expected lia-
bility from the accident when the insurer acts selfishly is $250 (1 % of
$25,000).' 3 By contrast, if the insured can extract from the insurer a
promise to settle the case, the insured is protected from any liability to the
plaintiff. Thus, the insured would be willing to pay more than $250
because of its risk aversion for an ex ante promise from the insurer to
settle. Recall that the added cost to the insurer of settling is only $5000
after the accident occurs, or $50 ex ante (1 % of $5000). Hence, there is
room for a profitable deal-the insurer would be happy to promise to settle
for an ex ante payment of $50 or more, and the insured would be willing
31. This claim follows from the definition of risk aversion-a risk averse individual confronted
with an uncertain prospect of loss, with a given expected value, would be willing to pay more than that
expected value to eliminate the risk of loss. The difference between the expected value of the loss and
the amount the risk averse individual would be willing to pay to avoid it is termed the "risk premium."
See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economics Analysis, 72
CAL. L. REv. 569, 627 (1984) (describing "risk premium" as "measur[ing] how much an individual
would be willing to pay for the privilege of purchasing actuarially fair insurance"). It is the existence
of positive risk premiums that makes the insurance business profitable and creates the gains from trade
under an insurance contract. See HERBERT S. DENENBERCO, RISK AND INSURANCE 17-18 (1974)
(discussing the concept of risk aversion in the insurance context).
32. Recall that the $45,000 includes both the insurer's expected cost of liability after trial and the
expected litigation costs. See supra text accompanying note 30.
33. The $25,000 represents the insured's expected liability if the case goes to trial. See supra note
30 and accompanying text.
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to pay considerably more ex ante to obtain such a promise. An ideal insur-
ance contract4 in our example would thus require the insurer to settle in
return for a premium increase that both compensates the insurer for such
a promise and is less than the insured is willing to pay. Again, the result
here is quite general-when settlement would be joint-wealth-increasing and
the insurer acting selfishly would be tempted to litigate, the parties could
make themselves jointly better off if the insurer promised ex ante to settle
in return for an increase in the insurance premium that compensates for the
added cost."
This analysis has two implications. First, if its assumptions usefully
characterize the insurance arrangement, it suggests that parties to an insur-
ance contract containing a policy limit would ideally like to restrict the
insurer's discretion in settlement negotiations. The insured can benefit
even though the insurer is fully compensated by a premium increase-a
"Pareto improvement"' in economic parlance. A contractual provision
that allows the insurer to behave entirely selfishly, by contrast, is not an
ideal arrangement. This observation provides some basis for the claim that
unfettered insurer discretion in settlement decisions may be inconsistent
with the intent or reasonable expectations of the parties.
Second, the analysis suggests a possible standard to apply in restricting
insurer discretion. My numerical example hints that the insurer should be
induced to accept all settlement offers that are joint-wealth-increasing, even
if the insurer's selfish interests at the time the offer is made would lead the
insurer to litigate. Indeed, because of the insured's risk aversion, even
some offers that are not joint-wealth-increasing should ideally be
accepted-any such offer in which the joint loss in expected wealth is
smaller than the "risk premium" that the insured would pay to avoid its
share of the risk of liability.37 The disregard-the-limits rule fares rea-
sonably well from this perspective: If we assume that insurers are approxi-
mately risk neutral, an insurer without policy limits would accept any
settlement offer that increased its expected wealth. When the insurer
behaves as if there were no policy limits, its own expected wealth cor-
responds to the joint expected wealth of the parties to a contract with policy
limits-assuming, as before, that the insured can pay any judgment in
34. By "ideal contract" I mean the contract that would prevail if the parties could costlessly write
down the terms that best promote their joint interests-in economic parlance, the "first-best" contingent
contract.
35. The division of the joint gains between the insurer and the insured would depend upon the
structure of the insurance market. If the insurance market is competitive, for example, we would ex-
pect the premium to rise only by an amount necessary for the insurer to cover its costs, with the surplus
going to the insured.
36. PAULWONNACOTT, ECONOMICS 441 (1979) (defining "Pareto improvement" as a "changethat
will make one individual better off without hurting anyone else").
37. See supra note 31 (defining "risk premium").
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excess of the limits. Hence, the disregard-the-limits rule seemingly asks
the insurer to accept all joint-wealth-increasing settlement offers. The
insurer can comply with the rule and still reject some settlement offers that
would be accepted under an ideal contract due to the insured's risk aver-
sion, but the disregard-the-limits rule may nonetheless be a reasonable first
approximation of the ideal contract given the costs that would attend any
effort to ascertain the insured's risk premium. 8 Thus, the argument runs,
if insurance contracts omit a disregard-the-limits requirement-why they do
so remains to be explored-the courts can promote the joint interests of the
parties by inserting such a provision after the fact.
B. Qualifications and Refinements to the Basic Argument: Reputation,
Coasean Bargaining, and Asymmetric Information
The illustration above supposes that, in the absence of contractual or
judicial restrictions on insurers' discretion, insurers will reject joint-wealth-
increasing settlement offers whenever litigation increases their own ex-
pected wealth. That supposition is no doubt too strong for the reasons
described below.
First, insurers care about their reputations in the marketplace. When
an insurer rejects a settlement offer that is within the policy limits and the
policyholder ultimately bears substantial uncovered liability, insurers can
anticipate that the policyholder will not keep quiet about the matter. The
insurer will likely suffer some market penalty even in the absence of any
legal penalty following a bad faith lawsuit.39 The magnitude of such a
market penalty is, however, unclear. Information about insurer behavior
during settlement negotiations may disseminate poorly in the marketplace,
and even when it is conveyed, potential customers may have little basis for
judging whether an insurer's decision to reject a settlement offer was rea-
sonable. Thus, although it would be a mistake to dismiss the importance
of reputational concerns out of hand, it is unlikely that they will be
sufficient to control the conflict-of-interest problem completely.
A second check on the conflict-of-interest problem comes from policy-
holders themselves. In the numerical example above, we noted the oppor-
tunity for the insured to contribute toward a settlement when the insurer
would otherwise be tempted to litigate.' If settlement is joint-wealth-
increasing, there exists a payment by the insured to the insurer that is less
than the insured's expected uninsured liability at trial and that will suffice
38. This amount is wholly subjective and unobservable, and it cannot be ascertained with confi-
dence by a court.
39. See Syverud, supra note 3, at 1161 (noting the reputational effects of insurers' rejection of set-
tlement offers that their insureds would prefer to accept).
40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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to induce settlement by the insurer. Further, to the degree that insurers
anticipate the receipt of such payments, premiums should fall in order to
compensate insureds ex ante for what they must pay ex post. The reduc-
tion in premiums will likely induce some insureds to purchase more
coverage, further ameliorating the problem because as the policy limit
rises, the number of cases in which a conflict of interest emerges will
decline.41 The opportunity here for bargaining to avoid the inefficient
rejection of a mutually advantageous settlement offer, despite the absence
of a legal rule to protect the insured, is an illustration of the Coase
Theorem.42
Like reputational concerns, however, payments by the insured to the
insurer after a claim arises are only an imperfect solution to the problem.
The possible need to make such payments represents a risk to the insured
that, in an ideal world, would be borne by the superior risk bearer: the
insurance company. The payments thus represent a departure from optimal
risk sharing, the importance of which will depend upon the circumstances.
In addition, some insureds will lack the information necessary to determine
when to offer to contribute to a proposed settlement. Because liability
insurance usually provides the insured with legal defense services,43 in-
surers will often have better information both about the legal issues in the
case and about the possibility of a judgment in excess of the policy limits.
Thus, insureds may unknowingly fail to explore valuable opportunities for
making a contribution toward a settlement.
One might argue in response to this last observation that even if the
insured lacks knowledge at the outset, the better-informed insurer has an
incentive to reveal information to the insured in an attempt to ascertain
whether a profitable deal can be struck between them. However, asymmet-
ric information creates another problem. If the insurer is better informed
about the expected outcome of the case, what is to prevent the insurer from
exaggerating the expected value of uncovered liability? Indeed, the insurer
might employ such a strategy to extract a contribution from the insured that
is larger than what is really necessary to induce the insurer to settle.
Bargaining with the insured over a contribution to a settlement thus has a
double-edged quality-it may represent a (concededly imperfect) solution
41. The higher the policy limit, other things being equal, the less expected liability is borne by
the insured. The difference between the insurer's expected wealth and the joint expected wealth of the
parties diminishes, and the range of settlement offers that the insurer would be tempted inefficiently
to reject contracts. Likewise, as the policy limit rises, the number of accidents for which the insured
bears uncovered liability decreases.
42. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960)
(demonstrating that, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will contract to reach the most efficient
result, regardless of the law's assignment of rights).
43. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
1354 [Vol. 72:1345
HeinOnline  -- 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1354 1993-1994
Judicial Limitations
to the conflict-of-interest problem created by the policy limit, or it may
embody opportunism by the insurer. Again, premiums will tend to decline
if insurers are opportunistic, and insureds can respond by purchasing more
coverage. That outcome, however, is plainly less than ideal because the
optimal allocation of risk to the insurer is thwarted by the insurer's
opportunistic extraction of payments from the insured. The counterstrategy
available to insureds-retaining separate counsel to advise on the credibility
of the insurer's threat to litigate-is obviously costly as well.
These last remarks provide another possible economic justification for
judicial restrictions on insurers' discretion to reject settlement offers. Not
only may such restrictions discourage insurers from rejecting joint-wealth-
increasing settlements when the conflict of interest over settlement is bona
fide, but they may also discourage opportunistic behavior under conditions
of asymmetric information. Under the disregard-the-limits rule, for
example, an insured would know that even if the insurer threatened to liti-
gate unless the insured contributed to the settlement, the insurer would be
subject to liability for any judgment in excess of the policy limits if
settlement would have been joint-wealth-increasing. Hence, if the
disregard-the-limits rule is applied accurately, threats to litigate will not be
carried out so long as the settlement offer is, in fact, joint-wealth-
increasing. The imperfectly informed insured, protected by a disregard-
the-limits rule, might thus adopt a strategy of refusing to contribute to the
settlement if the settlement offer is within the policy limits, reasoning that
the insurer will carry out a threat to litigate only when the plaintiff's offer
exceeds the joint expected losses of the insurer and the insured. This
strategy is not ideal to be sure, due to the insured's risk aversion,' but
it may be the best that the insured can do in the face of imperfect infor-
mation, and it may leave the insured better off than it would be in the
absence of a legal duty to settle on the part of the insurer.
In summary, absent a legally enforceable duty to settle, two potential
problems arise: insurers may be tempted to reject some settlements that an
ideal contract would require them to accept, and insurers may attempt to
extract settlement contributions from insureds opportunistically. Concern
for reputation is likely an imperfect check on both problems, and although
pretrial Coasean bargaining can ameliorate the first problem if the insured
is well informed about the expected judgment, bargaining comes at the ex-
pense of optimal risk sharing. Finally, the imperfectly informed insured
will not know when to offer to contribute toward a settlement and cannot
be sure that the insurer will be truthful in disclosing information about the
possible outcome of the case. Consequently, insureds are vulnerable to op-
portunistic efforts by insurers to extract settlement contributions. For all
44. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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of these reasons, an ideal insurance contract arguably would contain some
restrictions on the settlement discretion of insurers, perhaps similar to the
obligation imposed by the disregard-the-limits rule. The remainder of this
Paper will explore difficulties with this economic argument for a duty to
settle, at least when that duty is imposed by the courts rather than expressly
by the insurance contract.
II. Objections to the Economic Case for Constraints on Settlement
Discretion
The argument outlined above requires a number of assumptions that
may not prove to be true in practice. Once these are relaxed, the economic
case for judicially imposed restrictions on settlement discretion weakens
considerably. Further, any benefits that might be derived from such re-
strictions must be weighed against the associated administrative costs,
which are likely to be considerable.
A. If Restrictions on Settlement Discretion Are Such a Good Idea, Why
Do Insurance Policies Omit Them?
The economic argument for restrictions on settlement discretion im-
plies that parties to insurance contracts would benefit by including such
restrictions. Yet, despite decades of attention to the problem of conflicts
of interest in the settlement context, policies systematically omit such
provisions today and typically have in the past.45 This fact poses a puzzle
that requires careful attention.
Insurance law students may be tempted to respond that this "puzzle"
is really nothing more than a straw man. Insurance companies have all the
bargaining power, they may suggest, and no opportunity exists for most
insureds to negotiate over the details of their policies. Thus, it is no
wonder that provisions on settlement discretion, like other policy pro-
visions, are unfairly designed to promote the interests of the insurer over
those of the insured.'
To an economist, however, arguments along this line are fallacious.
Even granting the assumption that insurance companies have considerable
bargaining power, which is at best a dubious one given the intensity of
competition in many insurance markets, 7 it would nevertheless be folly
for insurance companies to insist on policy provisions that are understood
45. See, e.g., Commercial Form, supra note 20; Auto Policy, supra note 21.
46. See Christina M.L. Lass, The Injured Third Party, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 843, 843 (1992) (stat-
ing that because the insurer's bargaining power is superior to that of the insured, the insurer controls
the policy provisions).
47. Banks McDowell, Competition as a Regulatory Mechanism in Insurance, 19 CONN. L. REv.
287, 309 (1987).
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by insureds to be joint-wealth-decreasing. To return to our numerical
example, recall that the policyholder would be willing to pay over $250 ex
ante for a promise by the insurance company to settle the hypothetical case
and that the cost to the insurer of such a promise was only $50 ex ante.4"
A profit-maximizing insurance company with all the bargaining power
would agree to settle at a cost of $50 and would raise the premium by an
amount approaching $250 in order to extract all the surplus from its
policyholder, thereby increasing its expected profit by $200. Equivalently,
omitting the promise to settle lowers the insured's willingness to pay by
more than it lowers the insurer's costs, thus reducing the insurer's potential
profit. Therefore, a sound explanation for the omission of joint-wealth-
increasing terms from the insurance contract cannot rest on the insurer's
advantage in bargaining power.
Another standard explanation for the omission of valuable contractual
terms involves the transaction costs of drafting and including them in insur-
ance contracts. If the costs of putting terms in writing are significant, and
if the probability or importance of the contingencies under which these
terms might prove useful is low, rational contracting parties may prefer to
omit the terms because the costs of including them exceed the expected
benefits. Such reasoning provides a conventional justification for contract
law "default rules" that approximate what the parties would have drafted
for themselves absent the costs.49  Appropriate default rules allow the
parties to avoid the transaction costs of writing custom agreements while
still enjoying many of the gains in joint wealth that customized agreements
would facilitate."
This argument similarly fails to provide a convincing explanation for
the omission of constraints on insurer discretion in settlement, or at least
it fails to justify any particular judicially imposed default such as the
disregard-the-limits rule. Most insurance policies are derived from stan-
dard forms developed by industry associations such as the Insurance Ser-
vices Office.51 Standard forms greatly economize on the costs of writing
detailed agreements, and a glance at almost any liability policy will reveal
terms covering all manner of low-probability contingencies. If a simple
constraint on insurer discretion such as the disregard-the-limits rule were
broadly valuable in insurance contracts, it could easily be included in
standard forms among existing policy terms. Thus, for the transaction
48. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
49. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic 7teory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (discussing the default rules for incomplete contracts as
gap-fillers, the basic purpose of which is to enforce "what the parties would have contracted for").
50. See E. ALLEN FARNSWoRTH, CONTRACTS § 7.15 (1982) ("If all terms were expressly agreed
to, even the simplest contracts would become intolerably long.").
51. E.g., Commercial Form, supra note 20; Auto Policy, supra note 21.
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costs of drafting to explain the omission of constraints on insurer discretion
in settlement, the appropriate constraints must vary across policyholders to
such an extent that attempts to standardize them would be unproductive.
Any universally applicable judicial default, such as the disregard-the-limits
rule, then becomes highly suspect.
There is a third possible explanation for the omission of valuable con-
straints on insurers' settlement discretion that may provide some basis for
the use of a judicially imposed default; however, it is hardly conclusive in
my view. This argument also relates to transaction costs-in particular, in-
formation costs. Policyholders, the argument runs, are typically unsophis-
ticated in legal matters and do not appreciate ex ante the consequences of
provisions that give the insurer complete discretion to settle.52 Indeed,
many policyholders cannot bring themselves to wade through their policies
at all, much less to reflect on the implications of particular terms down the
road. Thus, even if a sophisticated policyholder would value appropriate
constraints on insurer settlement discretion and would, in fact, be willing
to pay for such constraints, most policyholders are unsophisticated and do
not value them. Consequently, an insurer who includes such constraints
in a policy will incur costs that cannot be recouped through higher pre-
miums. Under competitive conditions, therefore, policies containing con-
straints on insurer settlement discretion will be driven from the market-a
"lemons" problem to use the terminology of Akerlof.53 Likewise, there
will be no incentive for industry associations to include such constraints in
their standard forms because they will recognize that, ultimately, insurers
will not use them.
While plausible, this argument also has its difficulties. Plainly, not all
insureds are unsophisticated in legal matters. Indeed, recall that the Com-
mercial General Liability Coverage Form, used as the basis for policies
sold to large companies with considerable legal resources, says nothing
about any constraints on the insurer's discretion to settle or litigate.' It
would be interesting to investigate whether any significant number of large,
commercial insureds have negotiated departures from the language of this
Form or its predecessors, particularly during the period prior to the wide-
spread acceptance of the bad faith cause of action or in the modern juris-
dictions in which the cause of action is fairly restrictive. I am aware of no
evidence to this effect, nor am I familiar with any modem cases in which
52. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1. § 2.8(a) (stating that the average buyer of insurance
"lacks information that would be essential to a reasoned choice about details of the transaction").
53. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 89 QJ. EcON. 488, 489-90 (1970) (noting that when consumers cannot distinguish good
products from bad, "bad (products] drive out the good because they sell at the same price as good"
products).
54. Commercial Form, supra note 20.
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such negotiated constraints on the insurer's discretion have come to light
through litigation.
If commercial insureds have never to any significant extent pressed for
contractual restrictions upon their insurer's discretion to reject settlement
offers, the inference that such restrictions are desirable is certainly
weakened. This point is reinforced by the fact that commercial insureds
have obtained other types of restrictions on settlement discretion-for
example, consent-to-settle clauses. Some insureds, like doctors sued for
malpractice, fear that settlements will damage their reputations. As a
result, insurers have responded for many years by offering policies under
which they cannot settle without the insured's consent.' " If the market is
responsive to the demand for constraints on the insurer's ability to accept
settlement offers, it seems that the market would also be responsive to a
demand for constraints on the insurer's ability to reject settlement offers.
As noted, that response does not seem to have been forthcoming either now
or previously, thus leading to the inference that insureds do not want such
constraints, that the constraints would require a degree of customization
that would be prohibitively costly, or that the administrative costs associ-
ated with them would swamp any gains.
Professor Logue, in his comment on this Paper, argues that sophisti-
cated insureds do not seek duty-to-settle clauses because modem courts
provide this protection automatically and such clauses would be, in effect,
superfluous.56 I am unpersuaded. The law did not always provide the
bad faith cause of action, and, more importantly, its workings in modem
courts can be quite uneven and unpredictable. 7 For example, juries are
often instructed that insurers must give "equal consideration" to the
interests of their insureds in deciding whether to settle, an instruction that
hardly ensures careful implementation of the disregard-the-limits rule, or
any other discernible principle for that matter. Other juries may be told
simply to decide whether the settlement offer was "reasonable," whether
there was "great risk of recovery beyond the policy limits," or something
else yet. 8 Therefore, if a specific principle like the disregard-the-limits
rule were generally desired by parties to insurance contracts, they would
do well to include it in their contracts to ensure its application later. But
as noted, I am aware of no evidence that sophisticated insureds have done
so with any regularity.
55. See Syverud, supra note 3, at 1172-85 (describing the advantages of consent-to-settle clauses
in professional liability insurance contracts).
56. Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-ProofProblem, 72TEX. L. REV. 1375,1382-83 (1994).
57. See Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 518 (Ct. App. 1992)
(observing that the concept of bad faith is amorphous and necessarily changes depending on the con-
text).
58. See ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 3:20 (collecting various formulations of the jury instructions in
bad faith actions).
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The argument that policies will omit joint-wealth-increasing terms due
to the insureds' inattention to detail or lack of sophistication also seems to
prove too much. Various terms in insurance policies sold to "unsophisti-
cated" consumers-terms equally buried away in the fine print-confer
significant benefits upon insureds. For example, the standard auto policy
includes, in its first-party medical coverage, payments to insureds who, as
pedestrians, are injured by a motorist.5 9 This is coverage that most
purchasers of an auto liability policy seemingly would not expect. The
same policy also provides coverage for bail bonds°--again something that
the typical purchaser seemingly would neither expect nor demand. The
presence of these and various other benefits 1 can only be explained, in
my view, by the existence of careful comparison shopping by some sophis-
ticated consumers whose preferences are eventually reflected in industry
standard forms. If such discriminating consumers indeed exist, it is by no
means obvious why their preferences regarding the conduct of settlement
negotiations would not also be reflected.
For these reasons, the omission from insurance policies of explicit
constraints upon insurer discretion in settlement is not self-evidently the
result of market failure. Quite the opposite, the omission may support an
inference that such constraints are undesirable after all or that the terms
would need to vary so much from policyholder to policyholder that the
transaction costs of customization would make them impracticable. Either
way, the notion that courts can benefit the parties to insurance contracts by
enforcing a simple and universally applicable default rule for insurers'
settlement decisions is problematic.
We also cannot necessarily infer that judicial constraints on settlement
discretion are valuable simply because industry-standard forms have not
made serious attempts to contract around either the modem law of bad faith
or the disregard-the-limits rule. The decisions in this area often rest on a
duty of good faith said to be implicit in every contract or on a tort duty
that is external to the contract. 2 It is not easy to contract around such
obligations. Many courts would likely strike down contractual waivers of
the obligation of good faith (or due care) on public policy grounds or as
being unconscionable.' Further, the inclusion of such waivers in a
59. Auto Policy, supra note 21, at 606.
60. Id. at 604.
61. See. e.g., Insurance Services Office, Business Auto Coverage Form (1990), in 1 SUSAN J.
MILLER & PHiLIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER's STANDARD INsURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 259, 263.1
(1991) (covering damages caused by war, whether declared or undeclared; insurrection; or rebellion).
62. See supra text accompanying note 12 (describing the various expressions of the insurer's
obligation toward the insured).
63. See ROBERT E. KEETON, BAsic TEx-T ON INSURANCE LAw § 6.3(a), at 351 (1971) (explaining
thejudicial regulation of contracts of adhesion to enforce the objectively reasonable expectations of the
parties); see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 49, at 87 (explaining that the duty of good faith is "an
immutable part of every contract").
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contract might mislead or frighten insureds and thereby do more harm than
good-who wants to contract with an insurer that disclaims its "good
faith"? Therefore, the fact that insurers seemingly acquiesce in the
persistence of judicial restrictions on their settlement discretion does not
necessarily support an inference that such restrictions are economically
desirable.
I do not wish to overstate the case. In the end, I believe that
inferences about the optimal bargain drawn from the terms of insurance
contracts are weak inferences and that none of the arguments presented
here rules out the possibility of a market failure in the insurance-
contracting process that might be correctable through judicial intervention.
I simply wish to suggest the possibility that insurance contracts may omit
constraints on insurers' discretion in settlement because such constraints are
not in the parties' economic best interests. The following sections present
economic arguments supporting this possibility.
B. The Inability of Insureds to Pay Judgments in Excess of Policy Limits
The conflict of interest at issue here-that occurring when the insured
wishes to settle but the insurer does not-would not arise absent a policy
limit." Insureds could thus avoid this conflict altogether by purchasing
liability insurance with sufficiently high coverage limits. Yet, often they
do not do so, suggesting that policy limits serve a valuable economic func-
tion notwithstanding any conflicts of interest that they generate. In fact,
although there are several reasons why insurance policies contain limits on
coverage, 6s among the most important is the fact that most insureds have
assets considerably less than the largest possible liability judgment they
might incur.' Individuals who are entirely judgment proof, for example,
have no reason to purchase insurance at all-it is irrational to insure against
loss if you have nothing to lose. Similarly, an individual with assets of
$10,000 is unlikely to want a policy with a $10,000,000 liability limit if
the premiums on such a policy would be $9000. In general, if the likeli-
hood of liability greatly in excess of an insured's assets is sufficiently high
and the premium for coverage to protect those assets fully is high enough,
the insured may prefer to take a chance on bankruptcy rather than part with
a sizable portion of its assets to preclude that chance altogether. The result
is often a policy limit that affords protection against smaller levels of
liability, but does not cover fully the larger claims that may arise.67
64. See supra text accompanying note 6.
65. See Alan 0. Sykes, 'Bad Faith Refusal to Settle by Liability Insurers: Some Implications of
the Jadgment-ProofProblem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 86 & n.25 (1994) (listing several possible expla-
nations for the existence of policy limits including the fact that insureds have finite assets and the fact
that the price of insurance exceeds the actuarially fair price).
66. Id. at 81.
67. The formal economics of insurance purchases by individuals with finite assets is developed in
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When a policyholder is underinsured because of its limited assets, the
consequences of restrictions upon the insurer's settlement discretion are
more complex. Consider first the earlier numerical example in which the
insured has a 50% chance of facing a $100,000 judgment and has a
$50,000 policy limit." Previously, we assumed that the insured could
pay the difference between the maximum judgment and the policy limit.
Let us now assume that the insured has only $10,000 in assets that the
plaintiff could reach under the applicable personal bankruptcy laws. Then,
the expected payment to the plaintiff is $30,000,6 even though the ex-
pected judgment is $50,000. Therefore, if defense costs are less than
$20,000, a $50,000 settlement is joint-wealth-decreasing. The insured's
risk premium7 may still make settlement worthwhile, but we know that
this premium will be less than $5000.71 If defense costs are sufficiently
low, therefore, an ideal insurance contract would require the insurer to
reject a $50,000 settlement offer.
Now consider the application of the disregard-the-limits rule in this
situation. Given an expected judgment of $50,000 plus defense costs, an
insurer with no policy limit would certainly accept the $50,000 offer-
assuming as before that the offer is "exogenous" and cannot be bargained
down. Thus, the earlier proposition-that the disregard-the-limits rule is
underinclusive of the offers that an ideal contract would require to be
accepted because it does not account for the insured's risk aversion-no
longer holds when we assume that the insured's assets are less than the
largest possible judgment.
To be sure, if the disregard-the-limits rule would place liability on the
insurer for rejecting settlement offers that the parties' joint interests require
to be rejected, Coasean bargaining' between the insurer and the insured
might ameliorate the problem. In particular, the insurer might offer the
insured a "bribe" in return for a waiver of a bad faith cause of action down
the road. However, because this bargain might be upset on public policy
Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 45 (1986) (concluding that
the motive to purchase liability insurance is diminished when an individual's assets are less than the
harm he might cause), and in Sykes, supra note 65, at 86, 86-95 (developing "a model of the optimal
contract between an insurer and an insured with limited assets").
68. See supra text accompanying note 7.
69. The expected payment is calculated by adding the expected contributions from the insurer and
the insured. In this case, the insurer's expected contribution is $25,000-50% probability of paying
the $50,000 policy limit-and the insured's is $5000 (50% probability of paying the $10,000 available
to its creditors).
70. See supra note 31 (defining "risk premium").
71. The insured's expected loss at trial is $5000, and the risk premium is the amount in excess of
$5000 that the insured would pay to avoid going to trial. Because the insured only has $10,000, the
risk premium must be less than $5000.
72. See supra note 42.
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or other grounds,' and because it could be costly to negotiate, the parties
may be unlikely to reach such an agreement very often.74 As a result, the
disregard-the-limits rule may have the effect of putting more assets at risk
than an ideal insurance arrangement would allow, thereby increasing insur-
ance premiums and making insureds worse off ex ante.7'
More generally, when insureds have assets insufficient to pay large
excess judgments, the possibility arises that no simple rule can come close
to replicating the disposition of settlement offers that most insureds and
insurers would desire under an ideal contract. Under such a contract, the
decision whether to litigate or settle would be dependent upon the insured's
assets at risk at the time of litigation, the policy limit, the exact probability
distribution of possible outcomes after litigation, and the insured's associ-
ated risk premium (or, upon the insured's degree of risk aversion or
"utility function"'76).7 Although we cannot rule out the possibility that
the disregard-the-limits rule would remain a serviceable default for many
insurance contracts despite all these complications, we can hardly be cer-
tain that this would be so. It is quite plausible that no single, simple rule
can adequately serve the needs of a large proportion of insureds. In fact,
this possibility may explain the absence of settlement constraints upon
insurers in actual insurance policies.
The analysis to this point is perhaps too simplistic, however, because
it treats the policy limits as fixed irrespective of the legal rule governing
the insurer's discretion in settlement. Things become even more complicat-
ed if we suppose that the insured chooses the policy limit with an eye
toward the settlement game that will be played in the event of a lawsuit.
Then, the effects of the disregard-the-limits rule-or of any other restriction
upon insurers' settlement discretion-will depend upon how the rule influ-
ences settlement demands and outcomes and upon how insureds respond to
these prospects by adjusting their level of coverage.
73. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
74. For reasons that we need not dwell upon, this bargain would also represent a departure from
optimal risk sharing. See generally Shavell, supra note 67; Sykes, supra note 65.
75. Two interesting issues here are whether the insured's bad faith cause of action can be assigned
to the plaintiff, and whether the insured must first pay the excess judgment to the plaintiff in order to
recover it from the insurer in a bad faith suit. Plainly, when bad faith doctrine allows the insured or
the plaintiff to recover more from the insurer than the plaintiff could recover from the insured, the
effect noted in the text is magnified. See generally ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 3:36 (highlighting the var-
ious approaches courts have adopted to resolve this issue and noting that most courts hold that an
insured need not first pay the excess judgment, but instead acquires a bad faith cause of action as soon
as the excess judgment becomes final).
76. See 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 202 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987) ("The representation of individual's preferences over distributions by the shape of their von
Neumann-Morgensternutility functions provides the first step in the modem economic characterization
of risk.").
77. See generally Sykes, supra note 65.
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Such issues are the focus of another recent paper of mine in which I
analyze the effects of bad faith doctrine in a model in which the insured's
assets are limited.7" Without going into great detail, the analysis begins
with the observation that as coverage declines, so does the plaintiff's reser-
vation price for settlement because the -plaintiff's expected return from
litigation falls.79 The plaintiff's best settlement offer is accordingly a
function of the policy limit, and a clever insured can select a limit with that
in mind. In my model, for a typical accident and an appropriately chosen
policy limit, the disregard-the-limits rule induces the insurer to settle, and
the insured bears no risk ex ante because litigation is unlikely to occur.'
By contrast, with no duty to settle imposed on the insurer, the insured must
choose between increasing the level of coverage to protect its assets against
a large judgment or bearing a risk of bankruptcy."1 Working under the
assumptions of this model, I demonstrate formally that for this reason the
insured prefers the disregard-the-limits rule to unfettered insurer
discretion.'
Yet, this result does not rehabilitate the case for the disregard-the-
limits rule when insureds cannot pay large judgments. The model employs
some strong simplifying assumptions.' Further, if insureds cannot pay
excess judgments against them in their entirety, there is an obvious
divergence between social welfare and the welfare of the parties to the
insurance contract. In particular, when insureds "externalize" part of the
risks that they pose to others, they may take too few precautions from a
societal perspective against injuring others, and they may expand their
risky activities excessively." In my model, this problem can grow more
acute under the disregard-the-limits rule because insureds may respond by
reducing their level of coverage. The reason for this reduction is that they
no longer need as much coverage to protect them from the risk of excess
judgments. Consequently, the possibility arises in my model that the
disregard-the-limits rule may benefit the parties to the insurance contract,
yet be socially unproductive because it leads to lower levels of coverage,
to greater externalization of liability, and thus to inadequate safety
measures and excessive risk taking.
78. See generally id.
79. The plaintiff's expected return diminishes because the plaintiff realizes that more of the
potential judgment will be above the policy limit and, thus, uncollectible.
80. See id. at 90-94 (noting that at a certain level of coverage, the disregard-the-limits rule will
lead the insurer to settle, thus bearing the whole cost of the settlement).
8 1. See id. at 88-90, 96-98 (discussing the no-duty standard and how it would affect the insured's
behavior).
82. Id. at 92-94, 98-99.
83. For a discussion of these assumptions, see id. at 100-07.
84. Id. at 107-08.
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In short, when insureds cannot pay large judgments, the problem of
crafting an acceptable solution to the settlement conflict-of-interest problem
becomes immensely more complicated. Although the conflict surely re-
mains, the case for the disregard-the-limits rule-or any other simple rule
that one might imagine-weakens greatly. We can no longer be confident
that such a rule tends to induce settlement in the circumstances in which an
ideal contract would require it. It is also possible that, because the
disregard-the-limits rule encourages insurers to settle more often, insureds
will find that they need less coverage, thus worsening the problems associ-
ated with liability externalization.
In his comment, Professor Logue suggests that these problems might
be resolved by widespread adoption of the "Michigan Rule," which modi-
ties the disregard-the-limits rule to ask whether the settlement offer was
less than the expected collectible judgment, taking into account the in-
sured's limited assets.85 It is not self-evident that such a rule is an
appealing solution, however, for at least two reasons. First, its ex ante
consequences for coverage choices and attendant liability externalization
have not, to my knowledge, been worked out, and thus its social-welfare
consequences remain unclear." Second, and perhaps more important, the
Michigan Rule apparently requires insurers, as a part of their analysis of
lawsuits in which settlement is a close call, to make an exhaustive survey
of their insured's assets. They must assess what would be protected by the
personal bankruptcy laws and what would not, value it, and then be held
accountable if their analysis was inaccurate or "unreasonable." Insureds
would have an incentive to lie about their assets to induce insurers to settle
during this process. In the end, bad faith litigation would become even
more complex than it is now. Therefore, even if the Michigan Rule might
be shown to be superior in a world of costless litigation and zero error, it,
is hardly clear that it is worth the additional transaction costs within the
insurance relationship and the additional litigation costs in bad faith law-
suits. I am even less sanguine about Professor Logue's suggestion that the
problems noted in this section might be addressed by legislation requiring
mandatory, universal liability insurance with no policy limits,87 but will
leave discussion of the difficulties with such a proposal to another time.
C. Bargaining with Plaintiffs
The illustrations thus far have uniformly assumed that the plaintiff's
settlement offer is "exogenous" and, consequently, that the insurer cannot
85. Logue, supra note 56, at 1386-90.
86. Professor Logue acknowledges the problem in Part V of his comment. See id. at 1393-94.
87. Id. at 1394.
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hope to bargain down the settlement amount by rejecting certain offers that
are otherwise joint-wealth-increasing. In reality, of course, bargaining
over the settlement amount is routine, and one must inquire how imposing
liability on an insurer for the rejection of certain settlement offers may
affect the insurer's bargaining position, and thus indirectly the welfare of
the insured.
At first blush, the possibility that an insurer may incur liability for the
rejection of "reasonable" settlement offers might seem to improve the
plaintiff's bargaining position and harm the insurer's. This is indeed a
possible, though not a necessary, consequence of the rule. In particular,
if the disregard-the-limits rule or any other restriction upon settlement
discretion is to enable the plaintiff to bargain for a larger settlement, it
seems that such a restriction must either increase the plaintiffs expected
returns from litigation or increase the defendant's expected losses. Other-
wise, the plaintiffs threat to litigate carries no more weight in bargaining
than it did before. But how might a doctrine such as the disregard-the-
limits rule have that effect?
I begin with a case in which the rule arguably has little or no effect
on the settlement amount. Return to the numerical example in the intro-
duction: the probability of a $100,000 judgment is 50%, the policy limit
is $50,000, and the insured can pay any excess judgment."' Let the plain-
tiff's litigation costs equal $10,000, and, for simplicity, suppose that the
plaintiff is risk neutral. Let defense costs also equal $10,000. Under these
assumptions, the insurer's total expected costs at trial are $35,000. 9
Suppose first that the insurer can reject any settlement offer with im-
punity. In this case, the insurer will not agree to settle for an amount in
excess of $35,000 unless the insured contributes. The insured faces an
expected excess judgment of $25,000 and would be willing to contribute
more than that amount to avoid litigation.' Thus, the most the plaintiff
can hope for is a settlement that exceeds $60,0001 by the size of the
insured's risk premium. The plaintiff, by going to trial, expects to net
$40,000,' and a risk-neutral plaintiff would not settle for less. Hence,
there exists a bargaining range between $40,000 and somewhat more than
$60,000 within which a settlement can occur.
88. See supra text accompanying note 7.
89. Expected costs to the insurer equal the $25,000 probable contribution to the judgment-50%
of the $50,000 policy limit-plus the $10,000 defense costs.
90. The insured would be willing to pay more because it is risk averse. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text (explaining the concept of risk aversion).
91. The $60,000 figure is reached by adding the expected settlement contributions of the insurer
($35,000) and the insured ($25,000)
92. Net recovery is the expected value of the judgment ($50,000) less associated litigation costs
($10,000).
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Now let the disregard-the-limits rule apply. An insurer without a
policy limit would benefit from any settlement below $60,000, 9 so as-
sume that the insurer will be liable for the entire judgment if it litigates
after rejecting a settlement offer of $60,000 or less.' The insurer will
not settle for more than $60,000, however, without a contribution from the
insured. Nevertheless, the plaintiff might still be able to obtain more than
$60,000. In particular, suppose that the plaintiff absolutely refuses to
accept a settlement of $60,000 or less. The rational insurer at this point
will contribute no more than $35,000 because a refusal to pay over
$60,000 is not bad faith. The insured will be in the same position as
before, confronting expected liability of $25,000 if the case goes to trial.
We can thus imagine the insurer paying $35,000 and the insured something
over $25,000, just as described above. The range of settlement outcomes
is the same, from $40,000 to something over $60,000, and if the settlement
range is unaffected, it is plausible that the actual settlement outcome will
be unaffected as well.
Of course, if the plaintiff in this example is willing to settle for less
than $60,000, the disregard-the-limits rule will assuredly affect the division
of the settlement payments between the insurer and the insured by eliminat-
ing the need for the insured to contribute to the settlement. This effect is
economically desirable because it shifts the risk to the better risk bearer.95
Hence, under the assumptions implicit in the discussion up to this point,
the disregard-the-limits rule seemingly does not harm the joint bargaining
position of the insurer and the insured, and it may benefit the insured by
protecting it from the risk of having to make a settlement contribution.
There are three reasons why this analysis may mislead, however, and
why the disregard-the-limits rule may indeed improve the plaintiff's
bargaining position. First, as noted in the preceding section, the insured
may have limited assets. The disregard-the-limits rule can then increase
the plaintiff's expected returns from litigation by reducing the extent to
which the insured's inability to pay large judgments lowers the plaintiff's
expected receipts.' And, if the rule increases the plaintiff's expected
93. The $60,000 figure here is the sum of the expected judgment ($50,000) and the defense costs
($10,000).
94. Actually, the analysis is a bit more complex because it is unclear to what extent the disregard-
the-limits rule requires the settlement offer to be weighed against the expected judgment plus defense
costs, as distinguished from the expectedjudgmentalone. "Ilf defense costs are added in, more settle-
ment demands will appear to be reasonable, and insurance companies are more likely to be held liable
for an excess judgment." Syverud, supra note 3, at 1141.
95. See supra text accompanying note 43.
96. This assumes either that the bad faith cause of action can be assigned to the plaintiff or that
the insured can recover from the insurer and use the proceeds to pay the plaintiff. It also assumes that,
contrary to the model in my prior paper, Sykes, supra note 65, the policy limit is not reduced in re-
sponse to the disregard-the-limits rule.
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returns, it likely also increases the minimum amount for which the plaintiff
will settle. Here, the simple intuition that bad faith doctrine enhances the
plaintiff's bargaining power may be correct.
A second way in which bad faith doctrine may enhance the plaintiff's
bargaining power arises when the damages for a finding of bad faith can
include more than just the excess judgment, and when there is also uncer-
tainty over how a jury may assess the insurer's reasonableness. If the
insurer is subject to liability both for the excess judgment and for additional
punitive damages, attorneys' fees, emotional distress damages, and the like,
the insurer's exposure in the event of a bad faith lawsuit is potentially
greater than that envisioned by our numerical illustration. Suppose, for
example, that the plaintiff in our hypothetical offers to settle for $65,000.
The insurer may well believe that the sum of the expected judgment and
defense costs is only $60,000, but may also worry that a jury will disagree
and find bad faith if the $65,000 offer is rejected. If a finding of bad faith
would require the insurer to pay not only the full $100,000 judgment, but
also considerable additional damages, the insurer may indeed be willing to
settle for $65,000 or more. Such an increase in the insurer's maximum
willingness to contribute toward settlement might be expected to increase
the settlement amount on average. Although the usual remedy for bad faith
is simply to require the insurer to pay the whole judgment, some jurisdic-
tions do allow additional damages.' In these jurisdictions, plaintiffs may
indeed gain a bargaining advantage from the disregard-the-limits rule or
any other "bad faith" doctrine.
A third way in which the disregard-the-limits rule may enhance the
plaintiff's bargaining power arises if it is difficult for the plaintiff to draw
the insured into settlement negotiations due to transaction costs or some
other impediment. This hypothesis is the focus of a recent paper by
Michael Meurer.9" Simple numerical examples suffice to convey the es-
sence of his argument. Suppose that the court will set damages at either
$10,000 or $50,000, with a 50 % probability that each judgment will occur.
Expected liability is thus $30,000.19 Assume now that litigation costs in
the absence of settlement are $10,000 for each party and that the insured
is able to pay any judgment against it. For simplicity, ignore the parties'
risk aversion and assume that each is risk neutral.
97. See ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 8:02-:15 (outlining the possible remedies available for a bad faith
claim, including compensation for other economic harms caused by the insurer's bad faith, damages
for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees).
98. Michael J. Meurer, The Gainsfrom Faith in an UnfaithfulAgent: Settlement Conflicts Between
Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 502 (1992).
99. The $30,000 figure is reached by adding the 50% probability of a $10,000 judgment ($5000)
to the 50% probability of a $50,000 judgment ($25,000).
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Consider first a defendant without insurance. The plaintiff's expected
gain from litigation is $20,000,100 and the defendant's expected loss is
$40,000.10 The $20,000 difference, equal to the parties' combined liti-
gation expenses, represents the joint gains from settlement. Meurer
assumes that the parties always "split the difference" in bargaining;"
thus, settlement occurs here at a payment of $30,000, exactly the amount
of the expected liability."3
Now, suppose that the same defendant purchases an insurance policy
with a $25,000 policy limit. Assume that the insurer bears the $10,000
defense costs and that the policy gives the insurer sole discretion over
settlement. Once again, the plaintiff's expected gains from litigation are
$20,000 because any judgment over the policy limit will be collected from
the insured. What is the maximum amount that the insurer will offer in
settlement? The expected payment under the policy at the conclusion of
litigation is $17,500.21 If the insurer elects to litigate, it will also bear
defense costs of $10,000. Hence, it seems that the insurer would pay up
to only $27,500 to avoid litigation. If the insured cannot be induced to
contribute to the settlement, then the range of possible settlements is
between $20,000 and $27,500. Any amount within this settlement range
is plainly below the $30,000 that the uninsured defendant would have paid
to settle under the split-the-difference assumption. The plaintiff never-
theless settles because the expected outcome of litigation is even less
favorable."t 5 Thus, Meurer argues that even without any risk aversion
on the part of the defendant, insurance can be beneficial to the defendant
in this context because it delegates the authority to bargain to the insurer,
who will refuse to pay as much as the insured might have to pay in the
absence of insurance."16 The insured can benefit ex ante because the'
competitively determined insurance premium is accordingly less than the
expected judgment in the absence of insurance.
To be sure, delegation of authority to the insurer is a two-edged
sword, as the following modified hypothetical suggests. Suppose now that
the liability judgment will equal either $20,000 or $100,000, again with a
50% probability for each outcome. The policy limit is assumed to be
$50,000, and litigation costs are $10,000. The plaintiff's expected gain
100. Net expected gain equals the expected judgment ($30,000) less litigation costs ($10,000).
10!. Total expected loss equals the expected judgment ($30,000) plus litigation costs ($10,000).
102. Meurer, supra note 98, at 505.
103. That is, the plaintiff receives a settlement equal to its "threat point" of $20,000 plus half the
joint gains.
104. The $17,500 figure is reached by adding the 50% probability of paying a $10,000 judgment
($5000) and the 50% probability of paying the $25,000 policy limit toward the $50,000 judgment
($12,500).
105. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106. Meurer, supra note 98, at 506-10.
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from litigation is $50,000,17 yet the insurer's expected loss is only
$45,000.11s Supposing again that the insured cannot be induced to con-
tribute to a settlement, the parties will now go to trial. If this situation
were sure to materialize after an accident, the purchase of insurance with
insurer discretion over settlement would be disadvantageous to the insured
ex ante. The insured would not only bear the full expected judgment
through a combination of insurance premiums and liability in excess of the
policy limits, but would also have to pay a premium to cover the insurer's
expected litigation costs.
Combining these illustrations, two possibilities arise when the insured
does not contribute toward a settlement. The first is that the delegation of
settlement discretion to the insurer will result in lower settlements. The
other is that the insurer litigates even though settlement would be required
under an ideal contract. It is an empirical question whether the costs of the
latter possibility outweigh the benefits of the former. But the insured's
ability to adjust the coverage level makes it more likely that gains will
result from the delegation of settlement authority to the insurer and, in
Meurer's formal model, a coverage level surely exists at which the benefits
exceed the costs. Thus, Meurer argues, the delegation of settlement
authority to the insurer is desirable from the perspective of the parties to
an insurance contract, and lawsuits after the fact by disappointed insureds
represent an effort to renege upon an implicit bargain."° Likewise,
Meurer's model implies that the disregard-the-limits rule is harmfid to
insureds because they can no longer exploit the bargaining advantage
associated with policy limits.110
As the numerical illustrations suggest, this analysis rests on the critical
assumption that insureds cannot be drawn into settlement negotiations. If
they can, any reduction in the insurer's willingness to pay toward a settle-
ment, when the insurer can refuse settlement with impunity, will be offset
by an increase in the insured's willingness to contribute. The problem of
insureds with limited assets poses a further complication. Nonetheless,
107. The plaintiff's expected gain equals the sum of a 50% probability of receiving a $20,000
judgment ($10,000) and a 50% probability of receiving a $100,000 judgment ($50,000) less $10,000
in litigation costs.
108. The insurer's expected loss equals the sum of a 50% probability of paying a $20,000judg-
ment ($10,000), a 50% probability of paying the $50,000 policy limit toward the $100,000 judgment
($25,000), and litigation costs ($10,000).
109. Meurer, supra note 98, at 506-10.
110. Id. at 519. Interestingly, Meurer nevertheless argues that the disregard-the-limits rule is
socially desirable for three reasons: (1) it eliminates the danger of socially inefficient litigation, as
illustrated by the second possibility above; (2) it eliminates the incentive for the insured to take on
excessive amounts of risk through policy limits that increase bargaining power in settlement; and (3)
it induces ex ante optimal caretaking by prospective injurers, assuming that expected judgments equal
the expected social costs of accidents. Id. at 520-21.
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Meurer's work provides a plausible account of how, at least in some cases,
the disregard-the-limits rule will harm the insured rather than help it.
In sum, it is certainly plausible that the disregard-the-limits rule will
weaken the bargaining position of the insurer and the insured in important
classes of cases. They may for that reason prefer not to incorporate it into
their contract ex ante. This provides another explanation for the absence
of this rule in standard forms and raises further doubts that judicial
constraints on insurers' settlement discretion will benefit insureds.
D. Administrative and Error Costs
Insureds, as a group, will benefit from judicial restrictions on insurers'
settlement discretion only if those restrictions prod insurers toward be-t
havior that an ideal contract would require, and then only if they do so at
a reasonable administrative cost. The analysis to this point has focused on
the first of these issues, concluding that the ability of prevailing doctrine
to move behavior toward that required by an ideal contract is, at best, in-
conclusive. Once administrative and error costs are taken into considera-
tion, the economic case for a judicially imposed duty to settle is weakened
further.
The disregard-the-limits rule, like other approaches to bad faith refusal
to settle, is a source of extensive litigation."' To my knowledge, data
on the total costs of third-party bad faith litigation do not exist, but there
seems to be little doubt that these costs have become quite significant in
recent years."' The existence of this Symposium and of practitioner
guides on the subject"' is testimony to the growing importance of bad
faith actions. The resulting costs to insurers of such bad faith litigation
must ultimately be recovered through insurance premiums."'
These litigation costs are compounded by the uncertainties that attend
bad faith litigation, particularly with a standard such as the disregard-the-
limits rule under which juries are asked to determine if a "reasonable
insurer" without policy limits would have accepted an offer that the
defendant-insurer rejected.1 ' I have assumed all along that juries will
interpret this rule as requiring them to determine whether an insurer with
no policy limits would have expected to lose more by litigating than by
111. See ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 3:19, at 46 n.8 (collecting disregard-the-limits rule cases from
18 states).
112. See Peter C. Haley & Brandt L. Wolkin, Bad Faith and the Financial Institution Bond, 25
TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 715 (1990) ("The dramatic increase in bad faith verdicts may be the most
important development in insurance litigation since... the 1960's.").
113. E.g., ASHLEY, supra note 1.
114. Douglas 0. Houser, Good Faith as a Matter of Law: The Insurance Company's Right to Be
Wrong, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 665, 665 (1992).
115. ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 3:19.
1994] 1371
HeinOnline  -- 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1371 1993-1994
Texas Law Review
settling. Yet, juries may not systematically interpret the instruction in this
fashion-does "reasonable insurer" necessarily mean "expected profit-
maximizing insurer" to the average jury?"6 Further, in many jurisdic-
tions, juries are not expressly instructed to focus on a "reasonable" insurer
without policy limits. The instruction may simply inquire about "reason-
ableness" in general, or whether the insurer gave "equal consideration" to
the interests of the insured, and so on. 117
Even when juries do think in terms of the costs and benefits of settle-
ment, it is hardly easy for them to measure these costs and benefits accu-
rately. The expected outcome of litigation at the time of the settlement
offer is difficult even for the insurer to determine. Thus, juries can do no
more than make a best guess about what the probable distribution of ex-
pected judgments, defense costs, and other factors was at the time the
settlement offer was made.
As a result of all these factors, it becomes difficult to predict how a
jury will resolve an allegation of bad faith made against an insurer.1 8
In turn, the parties to bad faith lawsuits may easily develop disparate
expectations about the likely outcome of the bad faith suit, thereby imped-
ing settlement and increasing expenditures on bad faith litigation.119
Related to uncertainty over the outcome of litigation is the possibility
of error. Suppose, arguendo, that the disregard-the-limits rule roughly
resembles what an ideal insurance contract would require. If so, unbiased
errors of judgment in the jury's application of the standard may not be
terribly harmful as long as damages are limited to the excess judgment,
because a risk neutral insurer will expect the standard to be applied
correctly on average and behave accordingly.1" But juries' errors may
not be unbiased.
In litigation between an individual insured faced with extensive
personal liability and a deep-pocket insurer, jury sympathies may tend quite
116. See Villiam W. Schwartzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575,575 (1991) (discussing
juries' inability to understand complex issues).
117. See ASHLEY, supra note 1, § 3:20-:21 (surveying the standards used by variousjurisdictions
in applying the disregard-the-limits rule).
118. See Hon. Joan B. Lefkowitz, New York Third Party Bad Faith: Is It a Plaintiff's Dream or
a Defendant's Nightmare?, 12 PACE L. REV. 543, 548 (1992) (noting that many lawyers have been
astonished by jury verdicts against insurance companies in cases in which they thought they had made
a solid presentation).
119. A basic conclusion in the economic literature on suit and settlement is that parties will litigate
rather than settle only if the plaintiff is more optimistic about the plaintiff's chances for success than
the defendant. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 555-56 (4th ed. 1992). Although
disparate expectations about the plaintiff's chances of success can run in either direction, a lack of
predictability in the outcome of cases, from which disparate expectations generally result, is likely to
result in a lower settlement rate.
120. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of awarding damages in
addition to the amount of the excess judgment).
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systematically toward the insured."' Further, juries may regularly over-
estimate the expected judgment at the time of the settlement offer and thus
erroneously find the insurer to have been "unreasonable." This tendency
may arise because bad faith suits will be brought only in cases in which the
eventual judgment exceeded the policy limits, and juries may assign great
weight to the actual amount of the judgment in deciding what the expected
value of the judgment was when the settlement offer was made. Indeed,
in some jurisdictions, an actual judgment in excess of the settlement offer
is said to support an inference that the offer was reasonable." Taken
to the limit, this approach could result in liability anytime a judgment
exceeds the policy limits and an earlier settlement offer within the limits
was rejected. Juries would then be imposing liability not only when the
insurer was unreasonable in refusing to settle, but also when the decision
to litigate was reasonable in light of the available information, but an
unfortunate outcome resulted.
Thus, despite its "negligence-like" formulation in theory, the
disregard-the-limits rule may drift toward a strict liability standard in
practice.1" It is not self-evident that strict liability would be worse than
the negligence formulation,12 but its consequences are certainly not fully
understood in this context.
Ill. Conclusion
Judicial restrictions on the discretion of liability insurers to settle or
litigate are imposed as a response to two potentially important
problems-the incentive for insurers to litigate inappropriately at times
because some of the risk is borne by the insured, and the possible incentive
for insurers to extract settlement contributions from their insureds oppor-
tunistically. A hard question is whether the cure is worse than the disease-
In this regard, it is at best doubtful whether the disregard-the-limits rule-
or any other single conception of "bad faith"-can come close to replicat-
ing what an ideal contract would require in most instances. Likewise, it
is not possible to justify existing doctrine on the basis of theory alone.
Although it is conceivable that bad faith doctrine serves the joint interests
of insurers and insureds or in some other fashion promotes social welfare,
a showing to that effect would require a wealth of empirical information
121. Cf. Robert K. Harris, The Impeachment Exception to Rule 407: Limitations on the
Introduction of Evidence of Subsequent Measures, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 901, 943 (1988) ("[Mlost
defendants will not raise the issue of insurance fearing that it will adversely affect the jury.").
122. ASHLsy, supra note 1, § 3:37.
123. That is, it may drift toward strict liability for any excess judgment whenever a settlement
offer within the policy limits has been previously rejected.
124. See Sykes, supra note 65, at 94-95 (detailing a formal model in which the disregard-the-limits
rule and the strict liability rule produce the same outcomes).
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not heretofore developed. Absent that showing, I see no convincing basis
for the widespread judicial interference with insurers' contractual discretion
in settlement negotiations.
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